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THE CHECHEN WARS, MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY IN 
RUSSIA 
Ali Askerov1 
Abstract 
Media, like religion, may create, escalate, or deescalate conflict. In the 
age of technology, parties to protracted conflicts often use the media for 
their propaganda purposes. In many cases, despite politically created 
discourses, individual media members struggle to reveal the truth of the 
violent confrontation that causes human casualties. This paper 
discusses Moscow’s tough media policy during the Chechen wars, 
especially from 1999 to 2009 during the Second Chechen War, and 
argues that Kremlin’s severe media policy in the course of the height of 
this violent conflict negatively affected the values of democracy in 
Russia. Nonetheless, Russia’s new media policy had affected different 
media means differently depending on their missions and commitment. 
To produce this paper, data were collected through interviewing twenty-
two Chechen nationals, including media experts, and randomly 
analyzing the contents of the Russian media and Chechen websites 
available online.  
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Introduction 
When the Chechens declared independence from Russia in late 1991, a 
new stage of the Russo-Chechen conflict started. Multiple causes of the 
conflict had escalated it into a war in 1994 (Askerov, 2008; 2011; 2014). 
During the First Chechen War (1994-1996), both the Russian and 
foreign press played a significant role in covering the news in the conflict 
zone. At this time, the Russian law allowed sufficient freedom for 
journalists to report news from the war zone in the North Caucasus. 
Unsurprisingly, hopes for war coverage in Chechnya developed with the 
escalating armed operations in Chechnya in the late 1990s with the 
renewal of the Second Chechen War. In parallel with the escalation of 
the conflict, the field of propaganda and war journalism grew quickly. 
The field of peace journalism was correspondingly becoming more vital 
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due to the need for the peaceful resolution of the conflict (Ottosen, 
2006). However, the Kremlin had formulated new policies to handle the 
Chechen issue that reduced the possibility of using a peaceful approach 
to the conflict.  
 
In the late 1990s, in Russia, as elsewhere with some established 
democratic institutions, the media had played an important role in every 
aspect of people’s lives. The mass media, including daily papers, TV, 
and radio, contributed to the formation of mainstream culture and public 
opinion through providing information and interpretation of events. 
Despite Russian media’s dynamic role in the public life, there had 
always been doubts whether the mass media reliably reported the entire 
story or introduced a slanted viewpoint from the clash areas in the North 
Caucasus (Steinbrink & Cook, 2003). Nonetheless, prior to the Second 
Chechen War that began in 1999, the role the media played in the 
everyday lives of people was as vital as its job in affecting overall public 
opinion. In addition to newspapers, television, and magazines, the 
electronic media also started to play an active role in describing the 
realities of the war in Chechnya. At this point, the Kremlin felt a 
necessity to redesign the role of the media to support its new aggressive 
policies towards Chechnya. This new approach had resulted in the new 
developments that affected the free press, democracy, and freedom in 
Russia. 
 
The Press: Free or State-controlled? 
The news from Chechnya could flow through the channels of the 
Russian media, foreign media, and local Chechen media. With the 
launch of the Second Chechen War in 1999, the Russian government 
developed a new Chechnya policy through strengthening the state’s 
administrative influence on the mass media. The new policy sought to 
significantly change the approaches used during the First Chechen War. 
The first official step to this end was Russia’s Security Council’s 
adoption of ‘Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation’ 
approved by President Vladimir Putin on September 9, 2000. This 
doctrine, which represented the official policy on ensuring information 
security in Russia, had increased the Kremlin’s capacity to shape the 
role the media played in reporting from the North Caucasus that was 
embattled in war.  
 
The State Duma adopted another law called ‘On Counteraction of 
Extremist Activities’ in June 2002. The new law further limited the role of 
the free media by prohibiting the “dissemination of extremist materials 
via the mass media and the conduct of extremist activities by the mass 
media” (Soldner, 2008:169). These legal documents that had adversely 
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affected the free media in Russia- one of the most significant signs of 
democracy in the country- were supported by the implication of the war 
on terror, which the Kremlin considered as equivalent to the Russian war 
in Chechnya. Consequently, these two important documents targeted 
primarily Chechnya rather than any other part of the Russian Federation.  
One of the major problems since 1999 was the local Chechen media’s 
inability to write about the Chechen realities freely, especially when the 
free Russian media had experienced serious difficulties in making its 
way into the republic. Local journalism in Grozny had degenerated due 
to Chechnya’s native journalists’ obedient articles uncritical of the local 
pro-Russian and central governments’ policies. Usually, both the authors 
and editors have demonstrated self-censorship to avoid facing political 
pressure, since most of the journalists in Chechnya work for the state-
controlled media that support the official federal position. The political 
and economic conditions in Chechnya have ruined the fertile ground 
necessary for independent journalism to develop in the republic. With 
the termination of the national Chechen government’s effective power in 
Chechnya soon after the start of the Second Chechen war, the 
newspapers in Chechnya lost their independence at least because the 
donors financing them wanted to avoid having any problems with the 
federal and pro-Russian local authorities.  
 
The Kremlin had created different problems for the journalists working 
for the federal Russian media and still writing about Chechnya-related 
issues. As the Second Chechen War began, most journalists had failed 
to obtain permission from the federal government agencies to enter 
Chechnya. This was an integral part of Moscow’s new policy to block a 
free information flow out of the war zone. The journalists who had 
managed to enter Chechnya, faced detention, interrogation, and 
deportation from the republic (Gilligan, 2010). The official pretexts for 
these actions have usually been the absence of journalists’ 
accreditation. 
 
In a number of cases, both foreign and Russian journalists took the risk 
of working without accreditation that resulted in their expulsion from 
Chechnya. The Russian authorities considered the independent Russian 
journalists as untrustworthy and they had been most likely to be subject 
to measures taken against them by regional authorities. For example, in 
early 2007, President Ramzan Kadyrov of Chechnya, whom the Kremlin 
granted a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in Chechnya, sued 
Kommersant, a Russian newspaper, for defaming his honor and dignity 
in an article entitled “Commandant of Chechnya” published on June 15, 
2006 (Marten, 2012).  
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By and large, independent Russian journalists have faced obstacles to 
entering Chechnya. Even during the First Chechen War, Vyacheslav 
Izmailov, a Novaya Gazeta commentator and a human rights activist, 
had faced difficulties in entering Chechnya because of his critical articles 
about the Russian and Chechen authorities. As a journalist and human 
rights activist, he has been active in Chechnya, and played a significant 
role in helping to free hostages held in the war area (Kirisenko & 
Shevelev, 1996). The journalists of Chechen nationality living in Moscow 
had found themselves subject to pressure from the pro-Moscow 
Chechen government in Grozny as well. The risks for the independent 
Chechen and non-Chechen journalists trying to report from Chechnya 
had been the same because the threat from government authorities and 
the intelligence services were based on the mode of covering the 
Chechen question. The only safe way of covering news from Chechnya 
had been to be in line with Moscow’s official position.  
 
The new official documents on media that targeted the free press had 
made the authentic covering the war in Chechnya more difficult since the 
majority of the Russian and Chechen mass media were state-
sponsored. Journalists who had written about the banned topics that 
were off-limits always put their lives at risk. Later, with the changing 
nature of the war, the risk level in writing about the Chechen conflict also 
started to change. Unlike the relatively quiet days that came after 2007, 
in the initial stages of the Second Chechen War, it was potentially fatal 
to write about the war realities in Chechnya such as the brutality of 
Russian federal troops, the torture of Chechen men in the filtration 
centers, the massacres of civilians, and the abductions of Chechen 
noncombatants.  
 
The Importance of Media in the Chechen Issue 
The media is of a vital importance in one’s understanding of essential 
aspects of the long-lasting stage of the Russo-Chechen conflict. 
Besides, the mass media has been important to the sides to conflict in 
forming public opinion in their own favor. The Russian state apparatus 
especially used the mass media for propaganda purposes toward the 
rebels during the second military campaign in Chechnya to both justify 
its aggressive policies and gain popular support (Trenin, Malashenko, & 
Lieven, 2004). First, the Russian authorities sought to gain popular 
support prior to launching its military operations in Chechnya in 1999 to 
legitimize the assault. The Kremlin then used the media as a means for 
degrading the Chechens by denouncing them as terrorists to justify its 
brutal policies in Chechnya. By the same token, the Chechen rebel 
leadership had tried to unveil the hidden layers of Kremlin’s dirty policies 
and use the media for its own propaganda purposes. 
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The Chechen leaders were aware of the importance of media in their 
struggle against Russia. During both the Chechen wars, the Chechen 
rebel leadership had paid close attention to public opinion, although not 
always successfully. The Russian and foreign journalists figuring out 
how to enter Chechnya had boundless access to the Chechen 
leadership who granted interviews whenever possible to make the 
Chechen position known well (Gilligan, 2010). The rebel leadership at 
the most noteworthy rank constantly attempted to provide the journalists 
with significant and truthful data. As this was against the Russian 
interests, the Kremlin had developed new policies to force the journalists 
to get information about the situation in Chechnya from the official 
Russian sources or through the state-sponsored media. The new media 
policy helped the Kremlin curb the relative freedom the media enjoyed in 
the 1990s before the start of the Second Chechen War. 
 
In the mid-1990s, the foreign, Chechen, and Russian media had had 
different approaches to addressing the Chechen question and the war in 
Chechnya. Foreign media had generally been critical of Russia’s policies 
and operations in Chechnya. Unlike the contentious positions of the 
Russian media, the foreign press had typically expounded on Chechen 
issues with some sensitivity and this, as a rule, irritated the Russian 
authorities (Oliker, 2001). The Chechen media had defended different 
views and positions, while some of the Russian media had taken 
Moscow’s side, with others either being impartial as much as possible, 
or being sympathetic to the Chechens. Due to Russian media’s relative 
independence during the First Chechen War, the Russian government 
was unable to impose a total news blackout from Chechnya in 1994-96 
(Benn, 1996). The media’s relative freedom is seen from the headlines 
most popular Russian newspapers used in 1994. For example, Izvestiya 
and Literaturnaya Gazeta, Russian newspapers, used titles such as The 
Chechen war was lost in Moscow and Russians may be facing a second 
Afghanistan in Chechnya, respectively (Benn, 1996). The Russian media 
had never used similar headings during the Second Chechen War, and 
this reflected the severity of Moscow’s new media policy (Soldner, 
2008).  
 
The time between 1996 and 1999, which is also known as the interwar 
period, was useful for the Russian authorities to evaluate the free 
media’s role during the First Chechen War that was not in favor of the 
Kremlin. This inquiry had made the government produce new media 
policies that were nationwide, however indeed focused on Chechnya so 
as to win the information war. Shortly before 1999, the Russian Ministry 
for Press, Television and Radio Broadcasting discharged a notice to all 
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Russian radio and television companies against TV programs involving 
the Chechen rebel leaders (German, 2003). This policy indicated that to 
succeed in the news war the Kremlin wanted everybody to accept the 
official version of events in Chechnya (Soldner, 2008). This warning, 
along with those mentioned above, was one of the first steps Moscow 
used against the freedom of the press in Russia. 
 
By prohibiting journalists from making contact with “terrorists” in 
Chechnya, the Russian authorities aimed at cutting off any alternative 
sources of information about the events in Chechnya (Gilligan, 2010). 
This policy ensured strict censorship of the Russian media, although 
some of the Russian media outlets and journalists did not obey the 
official restrictions. For example, the NTV news program did not always 
follow official warnings on the Chechen issue. Nevertheless, the Kremlin 
enforced an effective information cordon in Chechnya, in which the 
voices of the Chechen rebels and noncombatants were not heard 
(Soldner, 2008).  
 
The major Russian newspapers never had similar positions; some of 
them had defended the official policy of Moscow, while others supported 
the Chechens or tried to report impartially. However, the number of the 
independent media outlets in Russia diminished sharply during the 
Second Chechen War due to political pressure and economic hardships. 
In that situation, the role of certain individual journalists had gained extra 
importance in gathering fresh information from the zone of war and in 
disseminating it to the rest of the world.  
 
Perhaps, brave reporters and journalists are needed in wartime as never 
before, since in the contexts of violent conflicts, individual journalists 
play invaluable role in gathering and transmitting authentic information. 
In the Chechen case, the situation was not different. Individual 
journalists had played the key role in breaking state imposed censorship 
to the news of Chechnya. The difficult and dangerous conditions in 
Chechnya coupled with the legal restrictions imposed on journalists by 
the Russian government in the late 1990s made it extremely difficult to 
gather information in Chechnya, and report it from the country or publish 
a critical article in the Russian media. At least partially, the remarkable 
work of the journalists who endangered their personal lives in Chechnya 
made some part of the truth of the Chechen war known to the public.  
 
Many Western and Russian journalists travelled to Chechnya to bypass 
the ban on the media. Perhaps, the most famous of the Russian 
journalists writing about the Chechen issue was Anna Politkovskaya, a 
Novaya Gazeta investigative journalist and author of several books on 
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the Chechen question, who was murdered in 2007. Politkovskaya 
managed to supply the Russian public with knowledge of the tragic 
reality of Chechnya. In her articles and books, she also successfully 
highlighted the dangers of losing freedom of media and the growing 
authoritarian regime in Russia. She was extremely critical of President 
Putin’s political and economic policies. Politkovskaya was assassinated 
in October 2006. Although five men have been sentenced for her 
murder, it is still unknown who ordered her assassination. 
 
No journalist was immune in Chechnya including those who worked for 
the European media. Andrei Babitsky, for example, worked for Radio 
Free Europe, and he was one of the most famous journalists and war 
correspondents due to his coverage of the war in Chechnya (Skakunov 
& Ofitova, 2000). The Russian military authorities were not always happy 
with his reports, claiming that they often contained disinformation about 
the Chechen special services. Babitsky had presented the crucial 
distinction between the moderate and radical Chechen fighters refuting 
the Russian claims that all Chechen rebels were the same 
unapproachable terrorists (Gilligan, 2010). Babitsky had access to all of 
the Chechen leaders, including Shamil Basayev, whom he was able to 
interview. Babitsky disappeared in Chechnya on January 15, 2000. 
Later, Russian authorities admitted having him in their custody. The 
Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia claimed that Babitsky took part 
in an illegal armed formation in Chechnya. Soon, to avoid international 
condemnations the Kremlin had to grant him amnesty. However, his 
detention created fear among the journalists trying to enter Chechnya in 
pursuit of accurate information. The Russian authorities used the case of 
Babitsky to successfully justify restrictions on press freedom with 
regards to the Chechen question. 
 
The Chechen Media 
During both the Chechen wars, the Chechen media was not limited to 
the official state press alone, as it also included independent mass 
media, rebel mass media, and the Chechen media outside of the 
country. In the 1990s, the Chechens had numerous local newspapers 
such as Groznensky Rabochi (Grozny Worker), Chechenets, Put 
Johara, Ichkeria, Kavkazski Vestnik, Golos, among others, in addition to 
the Chechen newspapers published in Dagestan, North Ossetia, 
Georgia, and Azerbaijan. These newspapers had enjoyed some degree 
of independence during the national governments in the 1990s. 
However, by 2002, there were three republican, two city and nine 
districts newspapers in Chechnya that were supported or allowed by the 
Russian authorities (Jaimoukha, 2005). Since the early 2000s, the 
largest group of publishers has represented the state-sponsored mass 
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media published and distributed in the territory of Chechnya. Some 
media outlets are Vesti Respubliki, Daimokhk, Vesti Groznogo, and 
Gums, and a number of information agencies such as Grozny-inform as 
well as a number of local ТV and radio stations (Gilligan, 2010). After the 
withdrawal of the Chechen forces under Maskhadov from Grozny in 
2000, the general situation in Chechnya was chaotic. The Russian 
authorities did not wait long before starting to finance all the state 
newspapers. Naturally, their position on political issues firmly overlapped 
with the official position of the pro-Russian government in Grozny.  
 
Several factors constrained the survival and development of the 
independent mass media in Chechnya after the renewal of the war in 
1999. In the post-Maskhadov time, the new pro-Russian Chechen 
authorities had been reluctant to let a free media develop in Chechnya. 
The authoritarian regime that was formed in Chechnya in 2003 wanted 
to avoid any independent means of mass media in its domains. In the 
wartime conditions, no means of mass media in Chechnya could rely on 
its own financial potential, thus no truly independent newspaper 
emerged in the republic. In general, the economic power of the Chechen 
people and the tough rivalry of the state-run press had imposed a 
serious control on the development of the autonomous Chechen media. 
Perhaps, the only newspaper that tried to survive independently or semi-
independently was the Grozny Worker (Groznensky Rabochi). 
 
The Grozny Worker, previously called as the Golos Chechenskoi 
Respubliki (Voice of the Chechen Republic), was a relatively impartial 
newspaper. It became an independent means of media in 1995. The 
newspaper was also the only independent Chechen weekly during the 
First Chechen War that was able to avoid taking sides in this conflict 
(Politkovskaya, 2007). This policy helped the newspaper insure its 
independence in wartime conditions and it was able to receive grants 
from international donors such as the Soros Foundation, which was not 
welcomed by some Chechen warlords (Politkovskaya, 2001). The 
newspaper survived until the fall of 1999 and then restored itself in 2001 
for a short period. The Grozny Worker’s impartial position was very 
helpful in making the Chechen view known to the world, particularly 
when President Maskhadov had to hide to survive. However, since the 
newspaper did not serve anybody’s interests its survival was difficult and 
its writers were receiving numerous threats. The newspaper’s female 
workers undertook all responsibilities to publish the Grozny Worker in 
2001, when the editor-in-chief and all the male reporters left Chechnya 
because of the threats they received. One of its former local 
correspondents, Natalya Estemirova, also a human rights activist, was 
abducted and killed in Grozny in July 2009. 
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The rebel mass media has been one the most important sources of 
reliable information about Chechnya. It has included several 
underground publications. Some of them have been published in 
Chechnya since 1996 on a weekly basis. Two newspapers, Sign of 
Jihad and Way of Jihad, the organs of Chechen religious radicals, have 
been active in inspiring the Chechen people to resist the Russian 
occupation and pro-Russian Chechen forces. Two others, Mekh-khel 
and Varis, have supported an independent Chechnya, and held anti-
Russian positions. The newspaper Ichkeria, once the organ of 
Maskhadov’s government, had been for a while one of the most popular 
papers in the region.  
 
In general, the Chechen mass media based outside of Chechnya have 
had a political vision oriented toward the independence of the Chechen 
Republic of Ichkeria (now the Caucasus Emirate). They have mostly 
been Internet-based news agencies as well as on-line multimedia and 
websites, such as Kavkaz-center, Chechenpress, chechen.org, 
Daimokh, and Kavkazski vestnik. Since websites are not controlled, 
censored, and regulated by higher authorities, the Chechen rebels give 
priority to the websites as an effective media tool. Surprisingly, 
<www.kavkazcenter.com>, a website of the Chechen rebels, is a well-
organized media tool available in Russian, English, Ukrainian, Arabic, 
and Turkish. The website contains visual news in addition to printed 
news, and frequent interviews with the most important Chechen leaders. 
The website functions actively to utilize every single opportunity to justify 
the Chechen position for independence from Russia. For example, 
<www.kavkazcenter.com> distributed the WikiLeaks reports on the 
Caucasus involving Chechnya promptly in the wake of being posted on 
the web. The web is likewise an instrument of promulgation for Chechen 
radicalism that kindles contempt, in addition to psychological fighting 
with Russia, fundraising, recruitment, data mining, and coordination of 
the activities of the pro-independence Chechens.  
 
The Position of the Russian Print Media and TV News Programs 
In the post-Soviet Russia, the media has tried to be a mirror of the 
changes occurring in the country. It had especially been crucial to 
covering the news during the First Chechen War when it had enjoyed a 
significant freedom. Prior to the Second Chechen War, however, the 
Russian authorities toughened the working conditions for the 
independent media supporting the state-sponsored ones. Bolstering the 
conditions for the free media to block information flow from the war 
region was an central part of the Kremlin’s covertly framed new war 
policy. Since then, the portrayal of Chechens as an adversary had 
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become regular in the Russian official press (White, 2008). In some 
cases, certain Russian political forces created and exploited this 
depiction for their own purposes (Gilligan, 2010; White, 2008). 
Nonetheless, a generalization of the Russian print media would be 
incorrect, since the new media policy had affected different mass media 
differently.  
 
To report from the war zone foreign, local, and Russian journalists had 
been present in Chechnya, despite the difficulties created by the political 
discourse. Undoubtedly, the Russian mass media have played the most 
important role in spreading news about the First Chechen War and 
thereafter, and in influencing peoples’ opinions in Russia about this war. 
Several major Russian newspapers such as Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 
Krasnaya Zvezda, Pravda, Izvestia, Segodnya, Moskovskiy 
Komsomolets, and Novaya Gazeta, and TV news programs, Vesti, 
Vremya, and Segodnya, among others, have distinguished themselves 
in supplying news and commentaries about the Russo-Chechen war. 
Each of these newspapers and TV programs had had its unique 
approach to the crisis. 
 
Novaya Gazeta, a newspaper well known in Russia for its critical and 
investigative coverage of the country’s political and social affairs, had 
been renowned due to its publications of Anna Politkovskaya who was 
an unforgiving critic of Russia’s violent policies in Chechnya. 
Politkovskaya (2005; 2007) was also critical of the Chechen warlords, as 
well as those Russian military and politicians who had tried to perpetuate 
the war due to its advantages as a business. She wrote for Novaya 
Gazeta until her assassination on October 7, 2006. The newspaper has 
played a tremendous role in creating public consciousness about the 
war in Chechnya. 
 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, an opponent of Novaya Gazeta and the main 
administrative newspaper had always supported and tried to justify 
Moscow’s decision to use force in Chechnya. Rossiyskaya Gazeta’s 
ignorant position about the predicament of tragic civilian casualties in 
Chechnya can be explained by its administrative identity. The 
newspaper had extensively highlighted Moscow’s policies regarding 
humanitarian assistance to the Chechens. 
 
Renowned with its judgmental approach, Krasnaya Zvezda, an official 
newspaper of the Defense Ministry of Russia, dedicated substantial 
consideration to the war assessing it through the military lens. 
Unsurprisingly, this newspaper’s primary attention was paid to the 
casualties among the Russian troops while disregarding victims amid the 
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noncombatant population of Chechnya. It is almost impossible to find a 
report in this newspaper about the countless human rights violations by 
the military (Askerov, 2011). Krasnaya Zvezda chose to dehumanize 
and demonize the Chechens to justify the military cruelty in Chechnya. It 
had portrayed the Chechens as brutal, outrageous, untrustworthy, and 
unwilling to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.  
 
Pravda, a communist newspaper, had assumed an oppositional stance 
and been critical of the Kremlin’s war policy. It had drawn attention to the 
civilian victims of the war, and stressed the resistance of the native 
population to Russian troops. Pravda’s explanations of the causes of the 
war were linked to the disintegration of the Soviet Union thus stressing 
the importance to the communist ideology for peaceful existence of the 
former Soviet nationalities. Moreover, Pravda explained the Chechen 
crisis with the problems of democratization and poor economic reforms 
(Aliyev, 2008). 
 
The position of Segodnya, a daily for businesspeople, had been one of 
the most balanced of all the newspapers, although it had often criticized 
the ineffectiveness of the official policies and the army. The newspaper 
had argued that a bad peace was better than a good war. Segodnya had 
argued that in reaching the objectives the Chechen leadership was more 
successful than the Kremlin. Moreover, the newspaper claimed that the 
Chechen leadership had always been ready for peace negotiations 
especially during the First Chechen War and the Russian side had 
wasted that opportunity. Segodnya had persistently criticized 
totalitarianism in the country and amateurism of the Russian army 
arguing that the reformed professional military could avoid many 
problems in Chechnya (Romanov & Zamakhin, 2000). 
 
Izvestia, a liberal daily newspaper and former organ of Soviet 
government, had criticized both the decision of the Kremlin to use troops 
in Chechnya, and the mode in which this choice was implemented. 
Moreover, Moskovskiy Komsomolets, a daily newspaper for young 
Russians, had a specific opinion in its Chechen analysis. It had given 
priority to hostilities, civilian victims, the violation of human rights by the 
army, and the support of the local population to the Chechen leaders, 
thus revealing the untruths of the official sources. Moskovskiy 
Komsomolets had been successful in maintaining its impartiality. It had 
often labeled the army as the “occupants” and the Chechen rebels as 
“bandits.” The newspaper was particularly renowned for its irony and 
epithets (Rechkalov, 2010).  
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A number of Russian TV news programs such as Vremya, Vesti, and 
Segodnya have been important in their coverage of the Chechen wars 
(Tretiakov, 2005). The Vremya program that existed during the Soviet 
times has taken a more formal position, whereas Vesti has supported 
the government’s position. Especially during the first Chechen war, Vesti 
was quite mild in its critique of Yeltsin and the generals in the 
government who were influential in waging the war in Chechnya.  
 
One of the most balanced news programs was Segodnya of NTV, part of 
Vladimir Gusinsky’s media empire, which was founded in 1993. NTV 
was renowned for its independent and serious coverage of the events in 
Chechnya, revealing the darker sides of the war (Oates & Roselle, 
2000). It frequently criticized the Russian government for its military 
campaigns in Chechnya both during the first and second wars. NTV 
usually delivered news and observations on the conflict that endorsed 
people to arrive at an independent conclusion (Benn, 1996). The news 
program Segodnya had held a similar position to the Segodnya 
newspaper. Ultimately, NTV paid a price for its live coverage and severe 
investigation of the events in Chechnya and elsewhere in Russia. Its 
ownership was transferred to the state-owned Gasprom company in 
April 2001.  
 
The Russian side has utilized the electronic means of communication as 
well; despite the abundant resources it possessed to sustain print and 
visual mass media. The Russian websites have usually portrayed the 
Chechens as criminals, slave owners, and bloodthirsty barbarians. The 
oppositional websites, www.nazlobu.ru or http://www.molgvardia.ru, do 
not differ from the government-based websites in their approaches. 
Cyber war between the Russians and Chechens via the Internet seems 
to last forever. Unsurprisingly, the rebel webpages operate more 
cohesively because of their limited resources for print media and, more 
importantly, the ease of surviving online.  
 
Implications and Conclusions 
During both the Chechen wars, the media has played an undeniable role 
in spreading Chechen news in Russia and around the world. Throughout 
the First Chechen War, the media had enjoyed more freedom in 
reporting from Chechnya than during the Second Chechen War. Prior to 
the renewal of the war in 1999, the Kremlin chose to reinforce its 
censorship strategy over the war in Chechnya, which was a premonition 
of its new cruel combat policies. The new policies targeted the free 
media only and they did not affect the state-sponsored media outlets 
negatively.  
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The Chechen wars, especially the second one, and the diminishing 
value of Russian democracy are positively correlated due to the Russian 
war strategies that included fading the free media. The change of the 
Russian news coverage policy in Chechnya to effectively fight the 
separatists while hiding civilian causalities and other atrocities in the 
region impacted the democratic processes in the country negatively. The 
Russian media was much more independent during the First Chechen 
War and this made the Kremlin blame the media for the military failure in 
Chechnya. Consequently, the Kremlin invented the ways of blocking the 
flow of unbiased information from the war zone through the channel of 
the free press. The consequences of this policy have been contentious 
on not only the free media, but also Russian democracy, and civil 
society. 
 
The media had assumed a significant role in making reality of the war 
known amid the First Chechen War and at the early phase of the 
Second Chechen War. This had pushed the Kremlin to redefine 
Moscow’s official media-related policies in the early 2000s to block an 
information flow from the alternative sources of news about the military 
campaign in Chechnya. Moscow’s exercise of far-reaching political 
pressure on the Russian media targeted the free media, rather than the 
state-sponsored media. Consequently, new media policies had hit the 
free media, thus significantly affecting the development of the 
democratic institutions in Russia. The Russian free media, one of the 
major pillars of democracy, had become the victim of fulfilling its main 
duty that was reporting from Chechnya.  
 
The free media had been amply impartial during both the wars. In many 
instances, the positions of different Russian newspapers did not overlap 
on the same issue. In general, however, the Russian media was 
successful to question why the violent events were unavoidable and why 
they had occurred. The free media had blamed both the rebel Chechen 
leadership and the Kremlin for not adopting sufficient constructive 
positions to maintain a strategic distance from the shocking outcomes of 
war. It was the free media that had addressed whether the war was 
legitimate. The free media’s accusation of the Russian authorities, 
including Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, backfired by contributing to 
the fortification of the official media policy that worked against the free 
media itself and freedom of speech in Russia.  
 
The winners of the new media policies were the state-sponsored media 
outlets that had always supported the state position in the war. The new 
media policies sought to limit the media’s role in Russia to propaganda 
of the official positions. This minimized the difference between the 
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parties to conflict in terms of their information war strategies, since the 
rebel leaders had also employed the media as a tool for their 
propaganda purposes. Although media had played an important role in 
affecting the dynamics of the conflict, the Kremlin’s formal approach to it 
in the 2000s meant removing the differences between the use of the 
state and rebel medias.  
 
Russia’s new media policy had dramatically reduced its role in 
sustaining peace and democracy in the country. The Kremlin thought 
about the success in the war region through penalizing the free media 
that tried to objectively cover the Russo-Chechen war. The types of 
governmental punishment included buying off the media institution (for 
example, NTV), closing it down, or intimidating journalists through 
violence and abductions (for example, Politkovskaya, Estemirova, and 
Babitsky), among others. Nonetheless, the Chechen wars had been a 
test for the democratic media in Russia. Even though the reports and 
interpretations of the events in Chechnya varied from a medium to 
another, public opinion had questioned what in Chechnya was going on.  
 
Perhaps, the Russian media was not successful in foreseeing the 
renewal of the war in 1999 and warning against it. But experts argue that 
this is a common problem and media’s role in the early warning of 
conflict emergencies is a myth because of its insignificant impact on the 
public (Gowing, 1997). The new developments in Russia, however, 
deprived the media of its capability of performing duties of broadcasting 
impartial news sufficiently. The extensive governmental pressure on the 
free media had created instability in news distribution and, in general, 
negatively affected reliability of reporters and their editors.  
 
The new media policy necessitated a new official approach to 
independent journalists traveling to the region. The government’s 
increasing brutality against the individual journalists trying to candidly 
report from Chechnya had disclosed serious problems related to 
malfunctioning of the rule of law and democracy in Russia. It soon 
became obvious that restricting the free media and freedom of speech in 
the country meant oppressing the Russian civil society. Likewise, the 
local pro-Russian Chechen authorities oppressed the human rights 
activists in Chechnya.  
 
Also, the new policies had deprived the independent journalists of using 
their abilities to facilitate the reconciliation of the parties to the conflict 
through preventive journalism. Nevertheless, despite the political 
pressure, Russian free media did not totally disappear and Russian 
journalism had demonstrated the country’s exceptional potential for 
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peace journalism. The significantly large number of journalists’ deaths 
during the Second Chechen War was a logical consequence of 
Moscow’s new media policy. This also was a sign of the Kremlin’s 
preference to manage the Chechen predicament by using brute force.  
Unlike the free media, the Russian state-sponsored media had not faced 
any problems in their work. In fact, they had received great incentives for 
broadcasting news in line with the Kremlin’s official policies. The state-
sponsored media also assumed a role in camouflaging the state 
brutalities against the free media through their intensified production of 
news from the war zone even though it did not reflect the reality. In this 
situation, the importance of the Chechen rebel media as a better source 
of the war news had amplified, since they were not under Moscow’s 
control. Both the state-sponsored media and rebel media had 
contributed to the tensions by dehumanizing and demonizing ‘the other.’  
 
The Chechen rebels had made an effort to create their own media to 
spread news reflecting their views about the Chechen crisis. Their 
productive utilization of technological tools has been a key component of 
Chechnya’s fruitful information war. In general, the Chechen media had 
been active in covering the war news. The local Chechen press included 
both independent and separatist media. The free Chechen media that 
functioned legally was also affected by the new media policies of Russia. 
Perhaps, the most distinguished Chechen newspaper was the Grozny 
Worker, which was active and tried to be impartial in its activities of 
highlighting news in the country. Its refusal to have Russian sponsorship 
created grave problems for its survival. In 2009, Natalya Estemirova, a 
former Grozny Worker journalist and human rights activist, was 
abducted and killed.  
 
The analysis of the Russia newspapers that had played an influential 
role in informing the public or forming public opinion in the country 
shows that different Russian newspapers and TV news programs had 
been influenced by the official policies differently. Moskovskiy 
Komsomolets had exposed the propaganda of official sources, and 
Izvestia’s position can be qualified as liberally oriented while Pravda, a 
communist newspaper, assumed an opposition stance. Krasnaya 
Zvezda, an official newspaper of the Defense Ministry, devoted 
considerable attention to the hostilities, and evaluated them from a 
professional military perspective. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the main 
governmental newspaper, had always supported Moscow’s decision to 
use force in Chechnya. Novaya Gazeta, known for its critical and 
investigative coverage of the country’s political and social affairs, had 
obtained a radical position. The TV news programs were distinguished 
for their leadership throughout the country. Segodnya of NTV was the 
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most neutral and popular news program until it was taken over by the 
state.  
 
Both sides to the Chechen war, especially the rebels, have used the 
electronic media effectively. A number of factors have contributed to the 
rise of the Internet usage by the rebels. It is practically impossible to 
monitor or block all the websites, which makes its usage easy and 
effective. Besides, websites can be managed at any location, and they 
are not costly. The website organizers had also tried to reach larger 
audiences through the Internet.  
 
Nevertheless, Kremlin’s new media policies had not been able to entirely 
prevent the development of the mass media in Russia. The free media 
has gradually gained the power as well as the right to cover all aspects 
of the sociopolitical life of the country. At the same time, the mass media 
has reacted quickly and decisively to any attempts to control their 
activities. Besides, Moscow’s gradual but decisive gains in Chechnya 
have eliminated the necessities of covering war related regional news. 
The theme has gradually lost its value as a source of information thus 
diminishing the importance of the scandalous media doctrines targeting 
Chechnya. 
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